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I.    INTRODUCTION 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), an 
“epidemic” is “an increase, often sudden, in the number of cases of a disease 
above what is normally expected” in a population of a specific area that 
“occur[s] when an agent and susceptible hosts are present in adequate 
numbers, and the agent can be effectively conveyed from a source to the 
susceptible hosts.”1  The epidemiological history of the United States has 
been marked by several epidemics that arose when foreign infectious 
diseases spread rapidly among previously unexposed American populations 
until vaccinations were developed to eradicate the outbreaks.2  Although 
not conventionally thought of as an infectious disease, the present epidemic 
the United States is combatting is opioid addiction and overdose.3  Unlike 
its predecessors, which were halted by medical intervention, the current 
opioid epidemic arose from prescribed medical treatment.4  
As reported for the first time in American history, an individual born in 
2017 is more likely to die from an accidental opioid overdose than from a 
car accident.5  Shockingly, more Americans aged fifty or younger die from 
 
1. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PRINCIPLES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN PUBLIC 
HEALTH PRACTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY AND BIOSTATISTICS 1-72 
(3d ed. 2006), https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dsepd/ss1978/SS1978.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GCG-
77AM] [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY]. 
2. See The Most Dangerous Epidemics in U.S. History, HEALTHLINE, https://www.healthline.com/ 
health/worst-disease-outbreaks-history#cholera4 [https://perma.cc/9YRC-2TXR] (last updated 
Sept. 29, 2016) (discussing the origination, impact, vaccination development, and current status of past 
infectious disease epidemics in the United States, including smallpox, yellow fever, cholera, typhoid 
fever, influenza, diphtheria, polio, measles, and whooping cough). 
3. Opioid Overdose, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
drugoverdose/index.html [https://perma.cc/X3V2-2HBN] (last updated Oct. 23, 2017) (stating the 
United States is experiencing an opioid overdose epidemic that was responsible for over 33,000 deaths 
in 2015). 
4. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE  
CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND 
OUTCOMES 6 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2017-cdc-drug-surveillance-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX6R-BHPV] [hereinafter 2017 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT] 
(describing the 1990s origination of the drug overdose epidemic as “driven by increasing deaths from 
prescription opioids that paralleled a dramatic increase in the prescribing of such drugs for chronic 
pain”); Prescription Opioid Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/overdose.html [https://perma.cc/9JC2-XDJF] (last 
updated Aug. 1, 2017) (recognizing opioid prescribing as the fuel of the drug overdose epidemic and 
reporting overdoses involving prescription opioids as the cause of death for more than 15,000 
individuals in 2015). 
5. Preventable Deaths: Odds of Dying, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, https://injuryfacts.nsc.org/ 
all-injuries/preventable-death-overview/odds-of-dying/ [https://perma.cc/S883-7HWA]. While 
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drug overdose than from discharge of a firearm or car accident combined.6  
In fact, death by drug overdose is more prevalent than any other cause of 
death among Americans under the age of fifty.7  Recent findings from the 
CDC estimate that over 64,000 drug overdose deaths occurred in the United 
States in 2016—an increase of 21% from the previous year8—and over 
70,000 occurred in 2017.9 
Equally alarming as the number of drug overdose fatalities in the United 
States is the number of deaths that can be attributed to the use of opioids.  
Each day, an average of 130 Americans experience death due to an opioid 
overdose.10  In 2015 alone, opioid overdose claimed the lives of more than 
33,000 individuals in the United States and accounted for over 60% of all 
 
Americans face a 1-in-103 chance of dying in a motor vehicle crash, their odds of dying due to an 
accidental opioid overdose are 1-in-96.  See id. (describing the likelihood of death by overdose versus 
death by car wreck); see also Shanley Pierce, Odds of Dying: For the First Time, Opioid Overdoses Exceed Car 
Crashes, TEX. MED. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2019), http://www.tmc.edu/news/2019/01/odds-of-dying-for-the-
first-time-opioid-overdoses-exceed-car-crashes/ [https://perma.cc/D3UC-SA9T] (pointing to illicit 
fentanyl use as the driving force in America’s opioid epidemic and exponential increase in death from 
drug overdose, which has overtaken injury among the “leading causes of lost life in young people” 
(quoting John Harvin, M.D., Memorial Hermann–TMC)).  
6. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION & THE OPIOID CRISIS, 
OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRAFT INTERIM REPORT 1 (2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/ondcp/commission-interim-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RNE7-6FH7] [hereinafter DRAFT INTERIM REPORT] (relaying the finding that 
drug overdoses are responsible for more deaths per year than gun homicides or car accidents 
combined). 
7. Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in American Are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES: THEUPSHOT 
(June 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-
overdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html [https://perma.cc/ZX8Q-DJNR]. 
8. Provisional Counts of Drug Overdose Deaths, as of 8/6/2017, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 1 (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/data/health_policy/monthly-drug-overdose-death-estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL22-
357A] (comparing the 52,898 drug overdose deaths occurring during the twelve-month period ending 
in January 2016 to the 64,070 drug overdose deaths occurring during the twelve-month period ending 
in January 2017 to find a total increase of 21%). 
9. See Opioids Portal, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
opioids/ [https://perma.cc/7GQ3-4CLB] (last updated Jan. 2, 2019) (“In 2017, more than 70,000 
people died from drug overdoses, making it a leading cause of injury-related death in the United 
States.”).  
10. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/5NMD-J7MP] (last 
updated Dec. 19, 2018) (reporting opioid overdose as the cause of death for 130 Americans every day); 
see also DRAFT INTERIM REPORT, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting data from the CDC estimates that 142 
Americans are killed every day by drug overdose). 
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drug overdoses.11  Of those opioid overdose deaths, nearly half involved a 
prescription opioid medication.12  In 2016, opioid overdose deaths 
numbered roughly 42,000, with over 40% resulting from prescription opioid 
use.13  During that year, a total of 61,862,364 patients filled or refilled at 
least one prescription for opioids, and retail pharmacies dispensed over 214 
million opioid prescriptions.14  Although the number of dispensed opioid 
prescriptions decreased to 191 million in 2017,15 opioid overdose deaths 
rose from 2016 to 2017.16  Since 1999, deaths resulting from overdose of 
prescription opioids have sextupled.17  These staggering statistics capture 
the severity of the opioid crisis.18  Applying the CDC’s terminology to the 
 
11. Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Death– 
United States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1445–46 (2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/pdfs/mm655051e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JCE-
LJSE] (“During 2015, a total of 52,404 persons in the United States died from a drug overdose . . . 
among these deaths, 33,091 (63.1%) involved an opioid . . . .”). 
12. Opioid Overdose, supra note 3 (noting the involvement of prescription opioids in close to “half 
of all opioid overdose deaths”).  
13. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, 2018 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND OUTCOMES 
22–23 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2018-cdc-drug-surveillance-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V7L5-K4A7] [hereinafter 2018 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT] (providing 
17,087 of the 42,249 deaths from opioid overdose involve prescription opioid).   
14. See 2017 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 9 (reporting “[a] total of 
61,862,364 patients had at least one prescription for opioids filled or refilled” and “[a] total of 
214,881,622 opioid prescriptions were dispensed by retail pharmacies” in 2016). 
15. See 2018 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10 (showing in 2017, “[a] total 
of 191,146,822 opioid prescriptions were dispensed by retail pharmacies”); see also Prescription Opioids, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/ 
opioids/prescribed.html [https://perma.cc/MPF9-2FPV] (last updated Aug. 29, 2017) (“In recent 
years, there has been a dramatic increase in the acceptance and use of prescription opioids for the 
treatment of chronic, non-cancer pain, such as back pain or osteoarthritis, despite serious risks and the 
lack of evidence about their long-term effectiveness.”). 
16. See Opioids Portal, supra note 9 (summarizing CDC data as revealing an increase in opioid 
overdose deaths from 2016 to 2017). 
17. Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 10 (“In 2017, the number of overdose deaths involving 
opioids (including prescription opioids and illegal opioids like heroin and illicitly manufactured 
fentanyl) was [six] times higher than in 1999.”). 
18. See Neha Casturi, A Modern Day Apocalypse: The Pill Mill Epidemic, How It Took Texas by Storm, 
and How Texas Is Fighting Back, 14 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 445, 446 (2013) (expounding on the rapid 
rise in overdose deaths from legally obtainable prescription medications, which surpassed overdose 
deaths of heroin, crack, and powder cocaine collectively in Texas); see also Synthetic Opioid Data, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/fentanyl.html 
[https://perma.cc/8JMS-XNVC] (last updated Dec. 16, 2016) (illustrating the severity of the opioid 
epidemic by reporting an increase of 72.2% in the mortality rate of synthetic opioids, excluding 
methadone, from 2014 to 2015).  But see DRAFT INTERIM REPORT, supra note 6, at 1 (noting increased 
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epidemic, one can consider prescription opioid medications as the “agent,” 
patients seeking pain management as the “susceptible hosts,” and 
pharmaceutical opioid manufacturers, prescribing physicians, and pill-
providing pharmacies as the “source.”19  
II.    FEDERAL AND STATE ACTION AIMED AT COMBATTING 
THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC 
Recognizing the need to counteract the grave public health threat that the 
opioid epidemic presents and to prevent it from overtaking more American 
lives, government action at both the federal and state levels has been 
initiated.20  Addressing the opioid epidemic nationally, President Trump 
established the Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid 
Crisis to “combat the scourge of drug abuse, addiction, and overdose (drug 
addiction), including opioid abuse, addiction, and overdose (opioid 
crisis).”21  Led by then-Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey, the 
Commission’s “first and most urgent recommendation” was for the 
President to “[d]eclare [the opioid epidemic] a national emergency.”22  The 
Commission reasoned that the President’s declaration would bring 
“intensity to the emergency” and warn every American that if the drug 
overdose epidemic “has not found you or your family yet, without bold 
action by everyone, it soon will.”23  Acting upon the Commission’s 
recommendation, President Trump officially declared the opioid crisis a 
 
 
restrictions on prescription opioid access has caused consumers to increasingly seek illicit “street” 
opioids, resulting in higher rates of overdose deaths from heroin and/or fentanyl than from 
prescription opioids in some states).   
19. See PRINCIPLES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1-72 (describing the role of the agent, 
susceptible host, and source in the creation and spread of an epidemic). 
20. Compare DRAFT INTERIM REPORT, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing the federal efforts of the 
Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis to understand and overcome the 
opioid epidemic, such as conducting “listening sessions” to hear recommendations of professionals 
from an array of medical and addiction-related fields, engaging in dialogue regarding the epidemic with 
Governors in all fifty states, and analyzing the more than 8,000 comments received by the public during 
the Commission’s first public meeting), with Jonathon Churchin, State Attorneys General Announce  
Joint Investigation into Opioid Manufacturer Practices, JURIST (June 17, 2017, 11:51 AM), 
http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/06/state-attorney-generals-investigate-opioid-drug-compan 
ies.php [https://perma.cc/F343-T8ZW] (examining states’ bipartisan efforts to investigate what 
responsibility may be attributed to opioid manufacturers for fueling the opioid epidemic and causing 
the widespread devastation and death that accompany it). 
21. Exec. Order No. 13784, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,283 (Mar. 29, 2017).  
22. DRAFT INTERIM REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. 
23. Id. 
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national emergency on August 10, 2017.24 
In March 2018, President Trump established his “Initiative to Stop 
Opioid Abuse and Reduce Drug Supply and Demand” to “confront the 
driving forces behind the opioid crisis.”25  The initiative was unveiled as a 
three-part plan: the first aiming to tackle prescribers’ over-prescription 
practices, reduce patients’ demand, and heighten the public’s awareness of 
the perils associated with opioid misuse; the second aiming to sever access 
to illicit opioids by dismantling drug supply chains; and the third aiming to 
equip struggling addicts with the resources, support, and evidence-based 
treatment methods conducive to recovery.26  Approximately six months 
after launching the initiative, the 115th Congress worked with the President 
to pass the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid 
Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (the SUPPORT 
for Patients and Communities Act)27 in October of 2018 “[t]o provide for 
opioid use disorder prevention, recovery, and treatment[.]”28  This 
bipartisan, landmark piece of legislation “expand[s] access to substance-use 
disorder (SUD) prevention and treatment programs”; “increases funding for 
residential treatment programs for pregnant and postpartum women”; 
authorizes the American Medical Association’s “alternative payment model 
demonstration project” to make outpatient treatment more accessible “for 
Medicare beneficiaries with opioid-use disorders”; permits grants from the 
CDC for states to implement improved prescription drug-monitoring 
programs; incentivizes medical professionals to enter the SUD field by 
offering “loan repayment for SUD-treatment professionals”; works to halt 
the influx by mail of illicit opioids into the country; increases funding for 
 
24. Donald J. Trump, Remarks Prior to a Security Briefing and an Exchange with Reporters in 
Bedminster, New Jersey (Aug. 10, 2017) (transcript available in 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700565/pdf/DCPD-201700565.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/3P26-DP2X]) (“The opioid crisis is an emergency, and I’m saying officially right now: It is an 
emergency.  It’s a national emergency.  We’re going to spend a lot of time, a lot of effort, and a lot of 
money on the opioid crisis.”). 
25. President Donald J. Trump’s Initiative to Stop Opioid Abuse and Reduce Drug Supply and Demand, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-
donald-j-trumps-initiative-stop-opioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supply-demand/ [https://perma.cc/2ZBQ 
-ZDE5]. 
26. See Ending America’s Opioid Crisis, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
opioids/ [https://perma.cc/V9QW-W5ND] (outlining the President’s three-part initiative as part of 
“the Trump Administration[’s] . . . all-of-Government approach to the epidemic”).   
27. Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for 
Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018). 
28. Id. 
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research initiatives meant to develop non-addictive painkiller alternative 
treatments; and assigns the Department of Health and Human Services with 
the task of assessing and reporting on the effect of federal and state laws 
that restrict opioid prescriptions.29 
In addition to the passage of the SUPPORT for Patients and 
Communities Act, other high points accomplished during the first year of 
the President’s opioid initiative included “secur[ing] $6 billion in new 
funding over two years to fight opioid abuse”; “award[ing] $1.5 billion for 
State Opioid Response grants”; “seiz[ing] enough fentanyl [at the southern 
border ports of entry during FY 2018] to kill nearly 90 million Americans”; 
“shut[ting] down the country’s biggest Darknet distributor of drugs”; 
breaking records for the “DEA’s National Take Back Days” by “recovering 
nearly 3.7 million pounds of unused prescription drugs”; partnering with the 
Truth Initiative and Ad Council to create “ads highlighting the dangers of 
opioids” that were viewed by “58[%] of young American[s] and 1.4 billion 
viewers”; “increase[ing] funding for drug courts by 53[%]”; and developing 
“job retraining and apprenticeships [for] those recovering from drug 
addiction.”30  By focusing attention not only on stopping the spread of 
opioid use but also on expanding the public’s understanding of threats 
related to opioid use and making more readily accessible resources dedicated 
to recovery treatment, the federal government has made tremendous strides 
in containing the opioid epidemic. 
However, while diagnosing the opioid epidemic as an emergency is the 
first step, and passing legislation that reduces opioid use and makes recovery 
more attainable is a noteworthy next step, a complete treatment of the 
epidemic requires a tactful take-down of the entities who have fueled the 
 
29. Kevin B. O’Reilly, 10 Ways the New Opioids Law Could Help Address the Epidemic, AMA 
(Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/opioids/10-ways-new-opioids-law-could-
help-address-epidemic [https://perma.cc/J5H7-THWL].  Bundled into the Act is the Eliminating 
Kickbacks in Recovery Act (EKRA), which penalizes Medicare and Medicaid providers with “criminal 
sanctions (up to $200,000 fine and/or [ten] years imprisonment] for each kickback violation.”   
See Eric S. Klein, The New Anti-Kickback Statute in Town, DYKEMA: HOMEOSTASIS (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.healthcareattorneyblog.com/the-new-anti-kickback-statute-in-town_030619 
[https://perma.cc/AWF6-2W5T] (“Congress established the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act 
of 2018 . . . as part of the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and 
Treatment for Patients and Communities Act of 2018.”). 
30. President Donald J. Trump’s Fight Against the Opioid Epidemic Continues to Help Americans  




Spiser: Combatting the Opioid Epidemic in Texas
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
1360 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1353 
opioid crisis.31  Texas has experienced local devastation from the opioid 
epidemic—of the 2,593 Texans who died from drug overdose in 2015,32 
1,186 suffered an opioid-related death.33  That number rose in 2016, with 
1,375 opioid-related deaths endured throughout the state that year.34  In 
fact, four of Texas’s cities are ranked among the top twenty-five with the 
highest opioid abuse rates: Texarkana (ranked tenth), Amarillo (ranked 
thirteenth), Odessa (ranked fifteenth), and Longview (ranked 
seventeenth).35  Paralleling President Trump’s declaration of the opioid 
crisis as a national emergency, the Texas Legislature amended Chapter 168 
of the Texas Occupational Code, “Regulation of Pain Management Clinics,” 
to reflect its findings of the magnitude of the crisis in Texas: 
 
31. See, e.g., Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, The Master Settlement Agreement:  
An Overview, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR. MITCHELL HAMLINE SCH. L. 1, 3 (2015), 
http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-msa-overview-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TB2S-KSKX] (describing a similar approach taken by states to combat the tobacco 
epidemic of the 1990s, in which states sued leading cigarette manufacturers to recover costs incurred 
in treating tobacco-related ailments and to impose restrictions on manufacturers’ marketing of 
cigarettes). 
32. Provisional Counts of Drug Overdose Deaths, as of 8/6/2017, supra note 8, at 1 (reporting 2,593 
deaths in Texas from drug overdose during the twelve-month period ending in January 2016).  See 
generally Raising Awareness to Help Save Lives, DOSE OF REALITY, http://doseofreality.texas.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/R3FW-MHUH], for a comprehensive assessment of the opioid epidemic in Texas 
provided through Attorney General Ken Paxton’s “Dose of Reality: Prevent Prescription Painkiller 
Misuse in Texas” initiative. 
33. Texas Receives $27.4 Million Grant to Combat Opioid Addiction, TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 
(May 19, 2017), https://hhs.texas.gov/about-hhs/communications-events/news-releases/2017/05/ 
texas-receives-27-4-million-grant-combat-opioid-addiction [https://perma.cc/3PNP-JRUY] (“Of the 
more than 33,000 opioid-related deaths in the United States in 2015, 1,186 were in Texas.”); see also 
Jane C. Maxwell, Brief Report on the Current Epidemic of Drug Poisoning Deaths, UNIV. TEX.  
AUSTIN SCH. SOC. WORK, https://socialwork.utexas.edu/dl/files/cswr/institutes/ari/pdf/opioid-
overdose-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GCA-QX4G] (finding the rate from drug overdose deaths 
involving opioids in Texas increased from 1.5 to 4.2 per 100,000 persons from 2000 to 2014). 
34. Raising Awareness to Help Save Lives, supra note 32. 
35.  See CASTLIGHT HEALTH, THE OPIOID CRISIS IN AMERICA’S WORKFORCE 8 (2016), 
https://www.wilmingtonnc.gov/home/showdocument?id=5561 [https://perma.cc/SNY5-PYHK] 
(finding opioid abuse is more prevalent in rural cities of southern states after determining that “[twenty-
two] out of the top [twenty-five] cities for opioid abuse rate” fall within that geographic categorization).  
When analyzing prescription opioid abuse, similar findings were reported: seventeen of the top twenty-
five cities are located in the rural south, three of them belonging to Texas (Amarillo, Texarkana, and 
Killeen).  Id. at 9.  Aiming specifically to address the cost of opioid abuse on employers, quantitated at 
roughly “$10 billion from absenteeism and presenteeism alone[,]” Castlight’s report focused on the 
prescription opioid abuse practices of close to 1 million American employees insured by employers 
using Castlight’s health benefits platform and relied on data from “medical and pharmacy-based 
claims . . . .  over the five-year period from 2011[–]2015” to more accurately portray for employers 
“opioid painkiller abuse in the workplace.”  Id. at 2–3. 
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The legislature finds that deaths resulting from the use of opioids and other 
controlled substances constitute a public health crisis and that there is a 
compelling state interest in the [Texas Medical Board] closely regulating the 
prescribing of opioids and other controlled substances by physicians and their 
delegates.  Accordingly, the legislature finds that inspections and 
investigations conducted by the board . . . are necessary to adequately regulate 
the prescribing of opioids and other controlled substances in order to protect 
the public health and welfare.36  
Much of the legislative action taken in Texas to address the opioid 
epidemic has focused on the physicians prescribing opioids and the 
pharmacists distributing the medication into the hands of Texan patients.37  
For example, health care practitioners who prescribe a Schedule II 
controlled substance are required to document the prescription on an 
official or electronic prescription form, which then must be accessed by the 
dispensing pharmacist to record the date the prescription is filled.38  Before 
prescribing or dispensing opioids, the prescriber, pharmacist, or other health 
care practitioner is under a duty to first access the patient’s official 
prescription form—failure to do so constitutes reason for disciplinary 
action.39  Further, the Texas Medical Board is required to “identify 
prescribing practices that may be potentially harmful and patient 
prescription patterns that may suggest drug diversion or drug abuse” and is 
authorized to relay an electronic notification to a prescribing health care 
provider or a dispensing pharmacist if the information submitted in the 
official prescription form “indicates a potentially harmful prescribing 
pattern or practice may be occurring or drug diversion or drug abuse may 
be occurring.”40 
Although these statutory provisions provide a system of checks on the 
physicians prescribing and pharmacists dispensing opioids, noticeably 
absent from their regulatory purview are the pharmaceutical companies who 
 
36. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 168.003 (emphasis added). 
37. See Casturi, supra note 18, at 454–55 (detailing Texas’s efforts to combat the opioid epidemic 
by focusing legislative attention on restricting the operation of pain management clinics and regulating 
the physicians who own or operate them). 
38. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.075. 
39. Id. § 481.0764. 
40. Id. § 481.0761(h)–(i)); see also OCC. §§ 559.0525–.053 (tasking the Texas Medical Board with 
developing “a continuing education program regarding opioid drug abuse and the delivery, dispensing, 
and provision of tamper-resistant opioid drugs” and authorizing the Board to require pharmacists to 
satisfy a portion of the thirty hours of continuing education required to renew their license through 
attendance at one of the opioid abuse programs). 
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originally manufactured the opioids and marketed them to health care 
practitioners across the state.41  
III.    HOLDING OPIOID MANUFACTURERS LIABLE— 
FROM INVESTIGATION TO LITIGATION 
While it is of urgent importance to prevent prescription opioids from 
being wrongfully prescribed by physicians, dispensed by pharmacists, or 
abused by patients, it is equally paramount to hold opioid manufacturers 
liable for their role in perpetuating the opioid crisis.  The foregoing 
discussion will consider Texas’s involvement in the multistate, bipartisan 
investigation into pharmaceutical manufacturers’ potential unlawful action 
in connection to the opioid epidemic, Texas’s transition from investigation 
to litigation, and theories of liability Texas can prevail on in a parens patriae 
lawsuit. 
A. Texas’s Role in Multi-State Investigation 
Understanding the need for such a multifaceted approach, several states 
have banded together to conduct an investigation into the potential unlawful 
conduct of opioid manufacturers.42  In June 2017, Texas, led by 
Attorney General Ken Paxton, joined the bipartisan multi-state 
investigation with the purpose of assessing “whether manufacturers have 
engaged in unlawful practices in the marketing and sale of opioids” and have 
thereby contributed to the devastation of Texas families resulting from 
opioid abuse and overdose.43  
Aside from the emotional toll the crisis has caused, the opioid epidemic 
has placed a detrimental financial burden on the nation.44  The abuse, 
dependence, and overdose of prescription opioids cost the United States an 
 
41. See, e.g., Casturi, supra note 18, at 454 (describing the focus of Chapter 168 of the Texas 
Occupations Code on owners of pain management clinics and the medical professionals prescribing 
pain medications from them, but not on the manufacturers promoting those drugs in the first place). 
42. Churchin, supra note 20 (summarizing the bipartisan investigation of Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas into opioid manufacturers’ marketing and sales practices as a means of 
combatting the opioid epidemic public health crisis). 
43. AG Paxton Announces Ongoing Investigation to Help Address the Opioid Crisis, ATT’Y  
GEN. TEX. (June 15, 2017), https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-announces-
ongoing-investigation-to-help-address-the-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/DBG3-86AJ]. 
44. See Hilary Homenko, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation: A Prescription for the FDA’s Next Proposal 
of an Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 22 HEALTH MATRIX 273, 283 (2012) 
(“Without prompt changes to the current opioid regulatory scheme, opioid abuse will continue to place 
an enormous financial burden on society.”). 
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estimated $78.5 billion in 2013—and the opioid epidemic has worsened 
since then.45  Costs spent on health care related to opioid abuse have been 
among the greatest in Texas.46  Holding liable the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers who introduced highly addictive opioids into the medical 
marketplace may be one method of recouping some of these costs. 
B. Turning Texas’s Focus to Litigation 
While a preliminary investigation may be necessary, Texas can only fully 
combat the opioid epidemic by making legal action against Big Pharma its 
next course of action.  Ample precedent exists for Texas to successfully 
litigate claims of legal misconduct against opioid pharmaceutical 
manufacturers—including the success of the federal government in holding 
one of the largest opioid manufacturers liable for misrepresenting the 
addictiveness of its opioid medication;47 the current litigation brought forth 
against Big Pharma by other states and cities around the nation;48 and the 
promising parallels that can be drawn from the Big Tobacco litigation of the 
 
45. Costs of US Prescription Opioid Epidemic Estimated at $78.5 Billion, WOLTERS KLUWER (Sept. 14, 
2016), http://wolterskluwer.com/company/newsroom/news/2016/09/costs-of-us-prescription-
opioid-epidemic-estimated-at-usd78.5-billion.html [https://perma.cc/D52N-55AT] (reporting 2013 
costs related to the prescription opioid epidemic of $28 billion in health care and substance abuse 
spending, $20 billion in lost productivity costs in nonfatal cases, $21.5 billion in fatal overdose costs, 
and $7.7 billion in costs associated with criminal justice). 
46. Health Care Costs from Opioid Abuse: A State-by-State Analysis, MATRIX GLOBAL 
ADVISORS, LLC 5 (Apr. 2015), https://drugfree.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Matrix_Opioid 
Abuse_040415.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD4L-C82K] (ranking Texas as second among the states 
suffering the greatest health care costs from the opioid epidemic in 2007, with $1,963,623,647 spent). 
47. See generally OFFICE OF AMBULATORY AFFAIRS, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN,  
THE ENFORCEMENT STORY: FISCAL YEAR 2007, 6-3–6-4 (2007), https://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/iceci/enforcementactions/enforcementstory/enforcementstoryarchive/ucm090311.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/47VE-92YY] (announcing Purdue’s agreement to pay $700 million to reconcile the 
criminal and civil penalties it faced after its illegal marketing schemes involving misrepresentations 
about the addictiveness of OxyContin were exposed by the Office of Criminal Investigations); Barry 
Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html [https://perma.cc/Z6LY-S24L] 
(“The company that makes the narcotic painkiller OxyContin and three current and former executives 
pleaded guilty today in federal court here to criminal charges that they misled regulators, doctors and 
patients about the drug’s risk of addiction and its potential to be abused.”). 
48. E.g., Plaintiff’s Original Complaint ¶ 16, Cty. of Titus v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 5:17–
cv–00189–RWS (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2017) (“As a direct and foreseeable consequence of Defendants’ 
misrepresentations regarding the safety and efficacy of using opioids for chronic pain, Titus County 
has spent and continues to spend large sums combatting the public health crisis created by Defendants’ 
negligent and fraudulent marketing campaign.”). 
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1990s, which culminated in the implementation of the Master Settlement 
Agreement.49  
An analysis of past and present federal and state governmental action 
against opioid pharmaceutical manufacturers will be useful in articulating 
the potential paths of legal action that Texas can take to hold Big Pharma 
liable.  Of the potential types of lawsuits which can be brought against 
opioid manufacturers for their contribution to and perpetuation of the 
opioid epidemic, including individual suits, class actions, and parens patriae 
lawsuits, the latter have garnered the most success.50  A parens patriae action 
is brought forth by state officials, asserting protection of its “quasi-
sovereign” interests, such as the health and well-being of the state’s 
citizens.51 
A recurring name in opioid manufacturer litigation is Purdue Pharma, 
L.P. (“Purdue”), the manufacturer of OxyContin52—one of the nation’s 
most prescribed Schedule II53 class narcotics54—and a self-proclaimed 
“industry leader in pain medication research and abuse-deterrent 
 
49. Alana Semuels, Are Pharmaceutical Companies to Blame for the Opioid Epidemic?, ATLANTIC 
(June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/lawsuit-pharmaceutical-
companies-opioids/529020/ [https://perma.cc/S38C-E82X] (discussing how the 1998 tobacco 
settlement may serve as strong precedent for states’ investigation of whether pharmaceutical companies 
soft-pedaled the addictive nature of opioids and thereby contributed to the opioid epidemic); see also 
Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, supra note 31, at 3 (recognizing the success of the Master 
Settlement Agreement in significantly limiting the advertising, marketing, and promoting of tobacco 
and in prohibiting tobacco manufacturers from engaging in business practices that conceal the negative 
effects of smoking). 
50. Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. 
VA. L. REV. 1117, 1146 (2014) (“Parens patriae lawsuits brought against Purdue by state officials have 
been far more successful than individual suits or class actions.”). 
51. Id. (describing the basis of parens patriae litigation as the protection by state officials of the 
general interest in residents’ health and well-being, whether physical or economic—also known as 
“quasi-sovereign” interests). 
52. Purdue Products, PURDUE, http://www.purduepharma.com/healthcare-professionals/ 
products/ [https://perma.cc/PX4G-HQTU] (listing OxyContin, containing oxycodone HCl, as one 
of the prescription opioids manufactured by Purdue Pharma). 
53. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.035(b) (referencing Schedule II drugs as 
substances which have “a high potential for abuse” and “may lead to severe psychological or physical 
dependence”). 
54. Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance 
in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 231, 273 (2008) (describing 
the rise of OxyContin availability and abuse from its introduction to the pharmaceutical market in the 
late 1990s to its rise as “the most prescribed Schedule II narcotic in the country” by the early 2000s); 
see also Gale Scott, Top 10 Painkillers in US, MD MAG. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.mdmag.com/ 
medical-news/top-10-painkillers-in-us [https://perma.cc/FF2N-9YMC] (ranking the generic and 
brand forms of OxyContin as the third and seventh most prescribed opioids in 2013, respectively).  
12
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technology.”55  Though the company describes itself as “committed to 
improving patients’ lives in meaningful ways by providing effective therapies 
along with educational tools that support their proper use[,]”56 Purdue has 
faced much criticism for its contribution to the widespread abuse of opioid 
pain medications and the destruction of patient-consumer lives.57  In 
September 2017, a coalition of forty-one attorneys general served Purdue 
with a supplemental investigative subpoena as part of its ongoing multistate 
investigation into the potentially unlawful practices of opioid 
manufacturers.58 
In addition to serving Purdue, the multistate investigation served other 
top pharmaceutical manufacturers with investigative subpoenas—including 
Allergan, Endo International, Teva Pharmaceuticals, and Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals—in order to examine whether the manufacturers were 
“complicit in creating the epidemic and whether [they] should now be 
responsible for helping pay for the damage caused to many  
 
55. About Purdue Pharma, PURDUE, http://www.purduepharma.com/about/ [https://perma. 
cc/G7DF-9NDP]. 
56. Id. 
57. See Ausness, supra note 50, at 1146–55 (addressing Purdue’s role in the opioid epidemic 
through an analysis of the individual lawsuits, class actions, and parens patriae suits that have been 
brought against the OxyContin manufacturer); Harriet Ryan et al., ‘You Want a Description of Hell?’ 
OxyContin’s 12-Hour Problem, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-
part1/ [https://perma.cc/H6QW-FFPN] (regarding OxyContin as being “widely blamed for setting 
off the nation’s prescription opioid epidemic, which has claimed more than 190,000 lives from 
overdoses involving OxyContin and other painkillers since 1999”); see also Press Release, Cigna Corp., 
Cigna is Committed to Reducing Opioid Use: Removing OxyContin from Group Commercial Drug 
Lists on 1/1/18 (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.cigna.com/newsroom/news-releases/2017/pdf/cigna-
is-committed-to-reducing-opioid-use-removing-oxycontin-from-group-commercial-drug-lists-on-111 
8.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB4L-LYRS] (implying Cigna Corporation’s focus on helping consumer-
patients obtain “effective pain relief while also guarding against opioid misuse” is justification for its 
decision to remove OxyContin from its list of covered medications, a change which will become 
effective January 1, 2018). 
58. Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman, Bipartisan 
Coalition of AGs Expand Multistate Investigation Into Opioid Crisis (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-bipartisan-coalition-ags-expand-multistate-investig 
ation-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/8MVX-BQNS] (announcing the multistate coalition of 
attorneys’ general demand for information and documents from opioid manufacturers, and detailing 
the commitment of the coalition to get “to the bottom of a broken system that has fueled the epidemic 
and taken far too many lives”); see also Nadia Kounang, 41 State Attorneys General Subpoena Opioid 
Manufacturers, CNN (Sept. 20, 2017, 11:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/19/health/state-ag-
investigation-opioids-subpoenas/index.html [https://perma.cc/3BW2-DKK8] (stating Purdue 
responded to being served an investigative subpoena by explaining it “share[s] the attorneys’ general 
concern about the opioid crisis and . . . [is] cooperating with their request”). 
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communities.”59  Furthermore, opioid distributors AmerisourceBergen, 
Cardinal Health, and McKesson received information demand letters from 
the coalition.60  Representing Texas in the bipartisan coalition, 
Attorney General Ken Paxton summarized that the goal of this phase of the 
investigation is to gather sufficient information for the coalition to 
“effectively evaluate whether manufacturers and distributors [are] engaged 
in unlawful practices in the marketing, sale, and distribution of opioids,” and 
to “determine an appropriate course of action once it’s determined what 
role these companies may have played in creating or prolonging the opioid 
crisis.”61 
IV.    THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
Focusing on the marketing and sale aspects of pharmaceutical opioid 
manufacturers’ unlawful practices, past and present litigation indicates that 
the following theories of liability may be viable courses of legal action for 
Texas to take.62 
A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
To prevail on a fraudulent misrepresentation claim in Texas, the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the defendant made a 
false, material misrepresentation; (2) the defendant knew its representation 
was false or stated it recklessly as a positive assertion absent any knowledge 
of its truth; (3) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act upon 
the representation; and (4) the plaintiff actually and justifiably relied upon 
the defendant’s representation and suffered injury from such reliance.63 
 
59. Yuki Noguchi, 41 States to Investigate Pharmaceutical Companies Over Opioids, NPR (Sept. 19, 
2017, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/19/552135830/41-states-to-
investigate-pharmaceutical-companies-over-opioids [https://perma.cc/8K3J-TEX4]. 
60. Kounang, supra note 58 (noting these three pharmaceutical distributors managed roughly 
90% of the nation’s drug distribution and generated over $400 million in revenue in 2016).  
61. AG Paxton: 41-State Investigation Requests Documents from Companies that Manufacture  
and Distribute Highly Addictive Opioid Drugs, ATT’Y GEN. TEX. (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-41-state-investigation-requests-doc 
uments-from-companies-that-man [https://perma.cc/7AJG-PF6X].  
62. E.g., Plaintiff’s Original Complaint ¶ 134, Cty. of Red River v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 
No. 5:17–cv–00185–RWS (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017) (alleging defendant opioid manufacturers 
knowingly made false and deceptive misrepresentations regarding the risks and benefits associated with 
using opioids to treat chronic pain).  
63. See Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001) 
(establishing the four elements necessary to prove to prevail on a claim of fraudulent 
misrepresentation).  
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Looking at the first element of this claim, the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, section 525 offers some guidance as to what type of conduct 
constitutes a “misrepresentation,” explicating that a misrepresentation can 
be made orally, in writing, or by other conduct amounting to “an assertion 
not in accordance with the truth.”64  Applying this guidance, Texas can hold 
Big Pharma opioid manufacturers liable for fraudulent misrepresentation on 
the theory that manufacturers systematically downplayed the addictive 
nature of opioids when marketing the drug to prescribing health care 
professionals.65  Purdue, for example, trained its sales representatives to 
relay to prescribers that OxyContin presented a less than 1% risk of 
addiction, despite a lack of scientific studies addressing addiction from long-
term opioid use, to substantiate its bold and deceptive claims.66  Purdue’s 
aggressive marketing scheme of soft-pedaling the addictive nature of 
opioids catapulted the pharmaceutical company’s commercial success, as the 
promise of a low addiction risk motivated prescribers to treat long-term 
chronic-pain sufferers with OxyContin.67 
Like Texas should, several states have turned to the deceptive marketing 
tactics of pharmaceutical opioid manufacturers as grounds for their claims 
of fraudulent misrepresentation.68  In Ohio, for example, 
Attorney General Mike DeWine contrasted the historical use of opioids for 
the treatment of short-term acute pain and palliative care—given that 
opioids were understood as being too addictive for use as a chronic pain 
treatment—with the broad use of opioids to treat chronically-pained 
patients encouraged in the marketing schemes of the Defendant opioid 
manufacturers, explaining: 
 
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“[W]ords or 
conduct asserting the existence of a fact constitute a misrepresentation if the fact does not exist.”). 
65. See Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health 
Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 223 (2009) (recognizing a “systematic effort to minimize the risk 
of addiction in the use of opioids for the treatment of chronic non-cancer-related pain” as a consistent 
component of Purdue’s marketing and promotion of OxyContin). 
66. See id. (discussing Purdue’s marketing and promotional tactic of claiming that use of 
OxyContin presented an extremely small risk of addiction). 
67. See id. (describing the boom of OxyContin sales, from $44 million in 1996—with 316,000 
prescriptions dispensed, to nearly $3 billion of combined sales in 2001 and 2002—with more than 
14 million prescriptions dispensed). 
68. See, e.g., Original Petition ¶ 122, State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ–2017–
816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2017) (seeking to hold opioid manufacturers and distributors liable on 
grounds of fraud for knowingly asserting false statements regarding the risks of addiction, efficacy, and 
medical necessity of opioids). 
15
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[B]y the late 1990s, . . . each Defendant began a marketing scheme designed 
to persuade doctors and patients that opioids can and should be used for 
chronic pain . . . .  [E]ach Defendant spent, and continues to spend, millions 
of dollars on promotional activities and materials that falsely deny or trivialize 
the risks of opioids while overstating the benefits of using them for chronic 
pain.  As to the risks, Defendants falsely and misleadingly, and contrary to the 
language of their drugs’ labels: (1) downplayed the serious risk of addiction; 
(2) promoted the concept of “pseudoaddiction” and thus advocated that the 
signs of addiction should be treated with more opioids; (3) exaggerated the 
effectiveness of screening tools in preventing addiction; (4) claimed that 
opioid dependence and withdrawal are easily managed; (5) denied the risks of 
higher opioid dosages; and (6) exaggerated the effectiveness of “abuse-
deterrent” opioid formulations to prevent abuse and addiction.69 
Similarly, the Office of the Attorney General of Kentucky asserted a claim 
of fraudulent misrepresentation against Purdue based on the deceitful 
marketing methods it utilized to bolster the benefits of OxyContin and to 
downplay the inherent risks of addiction associated with its drug.70  
Kentucky ultimately prevailed when, in 2015, the parties reached a hefty 
settlement agreement in which Purdue agreed to make nine installment 
payments to the Commonwealth of Kentucky totaling $24,000,000.00.71 
When assessing the second element of fraudulent misrepresentation—
that the defendant knew its representation was false or recklessly stated it 
without knowledge of its truth—section 526 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts explains: 
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker 
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be, 
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation 
that he states or implies, or 
 
69. Complaint: Jury Trial Demanded and Endorsed Hereon ¶ 4, State of Ohio ex rel. DeWine 
v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 010396–17 959286 VI (Ohio C.P. Ct. May 31, 2017). 
70. See generally Ausness, supra note 50, at 1150 (discussing Kentucky’s claim against Purdue for 
marketing and promoting OxyContin as being less addictive, despite knowing that such claims were 
false and misleading). 
71. Agreed Judgment and Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice ¶ 13, Commonwealth ex rel. 
Conway v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 07–C1–01303 (K.Y. Commw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015) (stating the 
payment terms of the 2015 Settlement Agreement reached between the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
and Purdue Pharma eight years after the Commonwealth’s initial complaint, which required Purdue to 
pay $24 million to the Commonwealth). 
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(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he 
states or implies.72 
Imposing a purely objective standard to find that a reasonably prudent 
individual in the defendant’s position would have recognized the falsity of 
the representation is not sufficient to hold the defendant liable for a 
fraudulent misrepresentation.73  However, actual knowledge of falsity is not 
necessary if the defendant believed the representation was false.74 
As applicable to states’ fraudulent misrepresentation claims for opioid 
manufacturers’ false marketing, a common argument made to satisfy this 
second element is that manufacturers knew their misrepresented assertions 
regarding the risks and benefits of opioid drugs were not scientifically 
supported.75  For example, the State of Illinois, in its claim of fraudulent 
misrepresentation against Defendant pharmaceutical opioid manufacturers, 
alleged that each Defendant not only knew of its misrepresentation of the 
risks and benefits associated with opioid drugs was unsupported, but also 
knew such misrepresented assertions “were directly contrary to scientific 
evidence.”76  Adopting Illinois’s approach, Texas can similarly assert that 
pharmaceutical opioid manufacturers misrepresented the use of opioids in 
a manner that diminished their addictive nature, knowing their claims were 
not supported, or even squarely negated, scientific evidence.77 
 
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977); see also id. § 526 cmt. a 
(clarifying the use of the term “fraudulent” as “referring solely to the maker’s knowledge of the untrue 
character of his representation,” and distinguishing this conduct—which courts frequently refer to as 
“scienter”—from the separate elements of “[i]ntent and expectation of influencing the other’s conduct 
by the misrepresentation”). 
73. Id. § 526 cmt. d. 
74. See id. § 526 cmt. c (“If the maker of the representation knows the matter to be otherwise 
than as represented, the fraudulent character of the misrepresentation is clear.  However, knowledge 
of falsity is not essential; it is enough that he believes the representation to be false.”). 
75. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 62, ¶ 78 (alleging opioid manufacturers 
and distributers “made claims that were not supported by, or were contrary, to the scientific evidence” 
to convince physicians to prescribe opioids for treatment of chronic pain).  
76. Complaint ¶ 36, People v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 17–L–11 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 26, 2017) 
(providing the CDC confirmed Defendants’ misrepresentation in its 2016 Guideline for Prescribing 
Opioids for Chronic Pain, in which the CDC found an absence of evidence indicating “a long-term 
benefit of opioids in pain and function versus no opioids for chronic pain with outcomes examined at 
least [one] year later”). 
77. See id. ¶ 38 (“Purdue . . . misrepresented that the potential for addiction even from long-
term use of its drugs was relatively small or non-existent, even though that was false and there was no 
scientific evidence to support it.”). 
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Unlike a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a claim of material 
misrepresentation carries with it a heightened standard of proof, given that 
the plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with an intent to 
deceive.78  In assessing whether the intent standard required in the third 
element of fraudulent misrepresentation has been satisfied, Texas courts 
apply the reason-to-expect standard of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
section 53179—under which liability for fraudulent misrepresentation is 
warranted if the defrauding party had reason to expect that the plaintiff 
would act in reliance on the misrepresentation.80  When assessing the 
justifiability of a plaintiff’s reliance, the court will consider whether the 
individual characteristics and aptitudes of the plaintiff, and the 
circumstances present before and at the time of the alleged fraudulent 
misrepresentation, make actual reliance by the plaintiff “extremely 
unlikely.”81 
As part of their marketing schemes, opioid manufacturers targeted 
specific types of health care professionals that were considered more easily 
persuaded by promotional messages and therefore more likely to prescribe 
opioids.82  On one hand, pharmaceutical companies targeted marketing 
efforts at pain specialists and anesthesiologists because these health care 
 
78. See Grant Thornton L.L.P. v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 921 (Tex. 2010) 
(recognizing the heightened difficulty in proving fraud, as opposed to negligent misrepresentation, due 
to having to establish that defendant acted intentionally to deceive). 
79. See Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 579–80 (Tex. 2001) 
(confirming “Texas jurisprudence is entirely consistent with section 531’s reason-to-expect standard, 
which requires a degree of certainty that goes beyond mere foreseeability” (first citing Geernaert v. 
Mitchell, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 487 (1995); then citing Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 
715 S.W.2d 408, 415 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.))). 
80. Establishing the “reason-to-expect” standard, section 531 states: 
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to the persons or class of 
persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon 
the misrepresentation, for pecuniary loss suffered by them through their justifiable reliance in the 
type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to expect their conduct to be influenced. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
81. See Grant Thornton L.L.P., 314 S.W.3d at 923 (explaining the court’s inquiry when assessing 
justifiability is whether “given a fraud plaintiff’s individual characteristics, abilities, and appreciation of 
facts and circumstances at or before the time of the alleged fraud[,] it is extremely unlikely that there is 
actual reliance on the plaintiff’s part” (quoting Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 
1026 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Texas law))). 
82. See Complaint for Damages ¶ 188, City of Parma v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. CV–17–
884281 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Aug. 9, 2017) (alleging opioid manufacturers determined which health care 
providers to focus marketing efforts on “based on the potential for persuading a provider to prescribe, 
ease of in-person access, and the likelihood of higher numbers of prescriptions at higher doses”). 
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providers comprised “the highest-volume prescribers of opioids” and had 
more extensive knowledge of the risks and benefits of opioids.83  On the 
other, opioid manufacturers increased marketing potential by expanding the 
scope of targeted prescribers to those who were “less informed about 
opioids and . . . more susceptible to [manufacturers’] marketing messages[,]” 
including nurse practitioners and physicians assistants.84  
Applying the reason-to-expect standard, Texas can argue opioid 
manufacturers focused their deceptive marketing schemes on reaching these 
specific categories of prescribers with the expectation that they would be 
more readily swayed by the marketing material and therefore more inclined 
to prescribe opioids to ailing patients.85  Such an argument was made in a 
parens patriae suit filed by two county officials on behalf of Californians, in 
which defendant opioid manufacturers were accused of “target[ing] 
susceptible prescribers like family doctors[,]” and “convinc[ing] them that 
opioids were not only appropriate but necessary for the treatment of chronic 
pain.”86  The complaint alleged the opioid manufacturers, as part of their 
cunning marketing schemes, “tainted the sources that doctors and patients 
 
83. See id. ¶ 189 (analyzing pharmaceutical manufacturers’ marketing strategy of focusing opioid 
promotional efforts on pain specialists and anesthesiologists, given their opioid prescribing patterns 
and greater education about the risks and benefits of opioids). 
84. See id. ¶ 190 (noting Endo Pharmaceuticals’ marketing plan to target nurse practitioners and 
physician assistants because this group of prescribers was more responsive to details than physicians 
and 96% of their prescriptions were written without consulting a physician). 
85. See Complaint ¶ 6, City of Tacoma v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 3:17–cv–5737 (W.D. Wash. 
Sept. 13, 2017) (“Despite minimal or arguably no scientific evidence indicating that opioids offer any 
long-term benefit in treating chronic pain, Defendants misleadingly advertised their opioids as a 
panacea and pushed hundreds of millions of pills into the marketplace for consumption, fueling a crisis 
of unprecedented levels.”).  In addition to the message stressed by opioid manufacturers’ aggressive 
and misleading marketing tactics that treatment of pain with opioids was necessary, a corollary message 
that potentially influenced prescribers was that treating patients’ pain with opioids was an act of 
compassion and benevolence.  See, e.g., Ronald Hirsch, The Opioid Epidemic: It’s Time to Place Blame Where 
It Belongs, KEVINMD.COM (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2016/04/the-opioid-
epidemic-its-time-to-place-blame-where-it-belongs.html [https://perma.cc/S86J-TMJF] (relaying one 
physician’s experience in being misled by opioid manufacturers’ deceptive marketing tactics, in which 
he attributed physicians’ tendencies to overprescribe opioids to their well-intentioned desire to keep 
their patients from suffering in pain, and deemed opioid manufacturers, predominantly Purdue, “the 
real co-conspirators”—stating “[p]hysicians, including myself, believed Purdue and started using 
Oxy[C]ontin, thinking we were helping patients”).  
86. Fourth Amended Complaint for Violations of Cal. False Advert. Law, Cal. Unfair 
Competition Law, & Pub. Nuisance, Seeking Restitution, Civil Penalties, Abatement, & Injunctive 
Relief ¶ 4, People v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 30–2014–00725287–CU–BT–CXC (Cal. Super. Ct. 
July 6, 2017) [hereinafter Fourth Amended Complaint]. 
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relied upon for guidance,” such as treatment guidelines and medical 
educational materials.87   
One counter-argument Texas can anticipate opioid manufacturers to 
assert is that any allegations of intentional misrepresentation in the 
marketing of their pain medications are negated by the clear warnings 
presented on the FDA-approved medication labels themselves.88  Though 
approval by the FDA may be one factor to consider in an assessment of 
whether opioid manufacturers were forthright in their marketing tactics, 
such a narrow argument fails to acknowledge—let alone, counter—the 
 
87. Id.  Defendant opioid manufacturers artfully targeted both susceptible prescribers and the 
medical information content upon which prescribers relied when assessing treatment options.  An 
analogous argument to that set forth by the People of California was asserted in a suit filed on behalf 
of New Haven, Connecticut residents, in which notable examples were provided to demonstrate 
defendants’ manipulation of guidance material, such as:  
(a) paying off doctors called “Key Opinion Leaders” [(]KOLs[)] to give speeches and write articles 
advocating the advantages of prescription opioids; 
(b) twisting scientific literature; most notably, transforming a five-sentence letter written to the 
New England Journal of Medicine in 1980[,] . . . regarding the relative safety of short-term opioid use 
by patients in a medical setting, into a false assertion (cited more than 600 times) that long-term 
opioid use in a non-medical setting has been proven to be “safe” and non-addictive; [and] 
(c) infiltrating medical societies and continuing medical education [(]CME[)] programs with the 
false information that chronic pain can and should be safely treated with prescription opioids[.] 
Complaint ¶ 3, City of New Haven v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. CV-17-6074956-S (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 25, 2017). 
88. See Defendants Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., & The Purdue Frederick Co., 
Inc.’s Reply in Support of Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint at 1, People v. Purdue 
Pharma, L.P, No. 30–2014–00725287–CU–BT–CXC (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2017) (claiming 
allegations that Purdue deceptively marketed opioids that should not be used in long-term, non-cancer 
pain treatment “conflict directly with FDA’s determinations and would effectively require Purdue to 
‘stop selling’ its products for their approved use, an outcome the Supreme Court has held is 
impermissible” (citing Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (2013))).  In responding to 
implications of liability for its contribution to the opioid epidemic, Purdue dodged addressing the active 
steps it took to deceive prescribers.  Id. at 2.  Instead, Purdue justified its promotional tactics by 
focusing on the FDA’s approval of its opioid medication label and touting protection from liability 
under the preemption doctrine.  Id. at 1.  Purdue matter-of-factly countered the People of California’s 
adverse claims, stating: 
Indeed, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevents the Counties from invoking State 
law to require statements about the safety and efficacy of Purdue’s medications that differ from 
what FDA has approved after its independent evaluation of the efficacy and safety information.  
California courts have applied these principles to hold State law claims preempted when, as here, 
the plaintiff seeks to require additional warnings that diverge from established federal policy . . . . 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 32 Cal.4th 910, 
929 (2004)). 
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discrepancy between the messages relayed on opioid prescription labels and 
the messages stressed to susceptible prescribers that downplayed the 
addictive nature of opioids.89  By taking a glance at the alarming warnings 
listed on the opioid prescription labels approved by the FDA, comparing 
such warnings to the unsubstantiated claims communicated by opioid 
manufacturers to susceptible prescribers regarding the efficacy of opioids 
and their minimal risk of addiction, and accounting for the empathetic 
nature of targeted physicians in wanting to ameliorate their patients’ pain, it 
is clear that opioid manufacturers both intended to fraudulently 
misrepresent the risks and benefits of opioids to susceptible prescribers and 
had ample reason to expect that prescribers would act in reliance on the 
misrepresentations.90 
In satisfying the fourth and final element of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim, Texas can prove actual and justifiable reliance  
on opioid manufacturers’ fraudulent misrepresentations by focusing  
on the direct correlation between the influx of deceptive marketing tactics 
and the astonishing increase in opioid prescriptions written by  
 
89. Compare id. at 6 (providing a warning of opioid addiction and abuse on Purdue’s OxyContin 
label that “OXYCONTIN has physiochemical properties expected to make abuse via injection 
difficult[;] . . . [h]owever, abuse of OXYCONTIN by these routes, as well as by the oral route, is still 
possible” (alteration in original)), and OxyContin Full Prescribing Information, PURDUEPHARMA, 
http://app.purduepharma.com/xmlpublishing/pi.aspx?id=o [https://perma.cc/K2UB-5YRH] (last 
updated Sept. 2018) (providing the complete boxed warning on OxyContin’s label, which alerts 
prescribers that “OXYCONTIN exposes patients and other users to the risks of opioid addiction, 
abuse, and misuse, which can lead to overdose and death,” and “OXYCONTIN contains oxycodone, 
a substance with a high potential for abuse” and increased “risk of adverse outcomes from abuse and 
misuse” due to its extended-release formula), with The People’s Opposition to Defendants’ Joint 
Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim at 6, People v. Purdue 
Pharma, L.P, No. 30–2014–00725287–CU–BT–CXC (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2017) (asserting 
Defendants’ understanding that “FDA-approved labeling for their opioids gives them license to make 
false and misleading statements about the risks of opioids because doctors and patients can always 
refer to the labeling for the truth” conflicts with well-established California law), and Fourth Amended 
Complaint, supra note 86, ¶ 121 (“FDA approval of opioids for certain uses did not give Defendants 
license to misrepresent the risks and benefits of opioids.  Indeed, Defendants’ misrepresentations were 
directly contrary to pronouncements by and guidance from the FDA based on the medical evidence 
and their own labels.”). 
90. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 62, ¶ 160 (alleging the marketing efforts of 
opioid manufacturers were “highly persuasive” because they “tainted virtually every source doctors 
could rely on for information and prevented them from making informed treatment decisions” and 
manipulated doctors’ beliefs “that opioids represented a means of relieving their patients’ suffering and 
of practicing medicine more compassionately”). 
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prescribers.91  In 2016 alone, over 289 million opioid prescriptions were 
written by prescribers, “enough for every adult in the United States to have more 
than one bottle of pills.”92  Such shocking prescribing rates are indicative 
of the persuasive power of opioid manufacturers’ deceptive marketing 
tactics and their ability to induce prescribers’ reliance on the fraudulent 
misrepresentations.93  To demonstrate injury suffered from this reliance, 
Texas can point to both the economic loss and the loss of human lives 
resulting from the opioid crisis.94  In November 2017, the President’s 
Council of Economic Advisers reported that the opioid epidemic cost the 
United States a confounding $504 billion in 2015 alone, a considerable 
increase from previous estimates of this cost.95  As bewildering as these 
national statistics are, they still do not fully encompass the enormous costs, 
both economic and personal, suffered by individuals and communities 
impacted by the opioid crisis.96  To articulate the individual and community 
losses suffered from the opioid crisis, Texas can utilize an argument asserted 
by one of its own counties in a lawsuit recently filed against opioid 
manufacturers.97  Upshur County drew attention to the social and public 
health costs of opioid abuse, stating: 
 
91. See Van Zee, supra note 65, at 221 (“When Purdue Pharma introduced OxyContin in 1996, 
it was aggressively marketed and highly promoted.  Sales grew from $48 million in 1996 to almost $1.1 
billion in 2000.”). 
92. See Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 2–3, 42 (contrasting the “skyrocketed” revenues enjoyed 
by opioid manufacturers due to the near ten-fold influx of sales of opioids, “the most prescribed class 
of drugs in America[,]” with the devastating loss and “crippling effects of widespread opioid addiction” 
that cities have suffered). 
93. See Van Zee, supra note 65, at 225 (“The use of prescriber profiling data to target high-opioid 
prescribers—coupled with very lucrative incentives for sales representatives—would seem to fuel 
increased prescribing by some physicians—perhaps the most liberal prescribers of opioids and, in some 
cases, the least discriminate.”). 
94. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 
UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
whitehouse.gov/files/images/The%20Underestimated%20Cost%20of%20the%20Opioid%20Crisis.
pdf [https://perma.cc/NAB4-S8YA] (regarding previous estimates of the costs of the opioid crisis as 
“greatly understate[d,]” given their “undervaluing [of] the most important component of the loss—
fatalities resulting from overdoses”). 
95. See id. at 8 (estimating $431.7 billion in total opioid overdose fatality costs, combined with 
$72.3 billion in non-fatal consequences of opioid addiction disorders). 
96. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 62, ¶ 168(i) (describing the incomprehensible 
harm communities have suffered due to opioid manufacturers’ deceptive marketing tactics, including 
“lives lost; addictions endured; the creation of an illicit drug market and all its concomitant crime and 
costs; unrealized economic productivity; and broken families and homes”). 
97. See Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 148, Cty. of Upshur v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2:17–
cv–00672 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017) (describing the cost of the opioid epidemic on Upshur County). 
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[P]rescription opioid misuse, abuse, and overdoes have an enormous impact 
on the health and safety of individuals, as well as communities at large, because 
the consequences of this epidemic reach far beyond the addicted individual. 
Some of the repercussions for residents of Upshur County include job loss, 
loss of custody of children, physical and mental health problems, 
homelessness and incarceration, which results in instability in communities 
often already in economic crisis and contributes to increased demand on 
community services such as hospitals, courts, child services, treatment centers, 
and law enforcement.98 
By proving that Texas physicians and patients actually and justifiably 
relied on opioid manufacturers’ fraudulent misrepresentations and suffered 
injury due to their reliance, Texas will have fulfilled the final element of its 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 
B. Violation of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
While a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation largely focuses on 
prescribers being deceived by pharmaceutical manufacturers, a claim under 
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) is consumer-focused.99  
The DTPA aims to protect consumers from false, misleading, deceptive and 
unconscionable business acts or practices, those which “take[] advantage of 
the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the consumer to a 
grossly unfair degree.”100  Under the DTPA, consumers may bring a cause 
of action for: 
(1) the use or employment by any person of a false, misleading, or deceptive 
act or practice that is: 
(A) specifically enumerated in a subdivision of Subsection (b) of Section 
17.46 of this subchapter; and 
(B) relied on by a consumer to the consumer’s detriment; 
(2) breach of an express or implied warranty; 
 
98. Id. ¶¶ 149–50. 
99. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (“This subchapter shall be liberally construed 
and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, 
and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide 
efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” (emphasis added)). 
100. Id. § 17.45(5). 
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(3) any unconscionable action or course of action by any person; or 
(4) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in violation of 
Chapter 541, Insurance Code.101 
To prevail on a claim brought forth under the DTPA, the plaintiff must 
establish (1) standing as a consumer, (2) breach by the defendant of one of 
the above provisions of the Act, and (3) injury resulting from the 
defendant’s violation.102  Furthermore, the plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant’s deceptive trade or business practice was “made in connection with” 
the consumer’s transaction.103  
Turning to the first element of a DTPA claim—establishing the plaintiff’s 
role as a consumer—the Act defines a “consumer” as “an individual, 
partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state 
who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services[.]”104  In 
the health care setting, patients who are prescribed opioids by a physician 
and who purchase opioids from a distributing pharmacy would be 
“consumers” of the medication for purposes of the DTPA.105  With 
57.6 opioid prescriptions dispensed per 100 individuals in Texas in 2016, 
there is evidently no shortage of opioid consumers in the state.106  As 
“representative of the public,” the Office of the Attorney General’s 
Consumer Protection Division has the authority to intervene in a class 
action brought by plaintiff-consumers.107 
In addition to intervening in a consumer class action, the  
Office of the Attorney General may independently bring forth a  
parens patriae suit against opioid manufacturers by invoking the  
authority expressly granted to it in under section 17.47 of the  
 
101. Id. § 17.50(a). 
102. See Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1996) (establishing a plaintiff-
consumer’s burden of proof to prevail on a DTPA claim). 
103. See id. at 649–50 (citing Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tex. 
1981)) (limiting the reach of a DTPA claim to those defendants whose practices were connected with 
the consumer’s transaction, and not to those who merely introduced “a particular product into the 
stream of commerce” at the beginning of a chain of manufacturing and distribution). 
104. BUS. & COM. § 17.45(4). 
105. See 2017 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 (reporting a national opioid 
prescribing rate of 66.5 opioid prescriptions per 100 persons in 2016). 
106. Id. at 42. 
107. See BUS. & COM. § 17.501(c) (describing the role of the Consumer Protection Division in 
representing the public in class actions brought under the DTPA).  
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Act.108  Section 17.47(a) equips the Consumer Protection Division with the 
authority to act “in the public interest” and “in the name of the state” of 
Texas to restrain individuals from engaging in any act or practice that 
violates the Act.109  When manufacturers or distributors “make unfounded 
or exaggerated claims about the effectiveness and/or safety of their 
products,” “fail to disclose risks,” or engage in other deceptive business 
practices, the DTPA vests the Attorney General with power to take action 
on behalf of affected consumers.110  Relying on this power, the Office of 
the Attorney announced in May of 2018 that it had filed a lawsuit to hold 
Purdue Pharma liable for violating the DTPA.111  In 2007, 
Attorney General Greg Abbott, acting through the Consumer Protection 
Division, similarly invoked this power to take action against Purdue Pharma 
for its alleged violation of the DTPA.112  Drawing specifically from the 
language of section 17.47, the state’s original petition expressed the belief 
that its proceedings against Purdue were “in the public interest” due to 
Purdue’s past and anticipated future engagement in unlawful business 
practices, causing “immediate and irreparable” damage to Texas and its 
citizens.113  Seemingly mirroring this language, Texas’s 2018 lawsuit against 
Purdue declared that the proceedings were “in the public interest” because 
they were filed based on the belief that Purdue and its related entities “have 
caused and will cause immediate, irreparable injury, loss, and damage to the 
 
108. See id. § 17.47(a) (granting the Consumer Protection Division the authority to act on the 
state’s behalf in restraining a person from carrying out any act or practice deemed unlawful under the 
DTPA). 
109. See id. (permitting the Consumer Protection Division to serve the public interest by 
restraining any act or practice believed to be in violation of the DTPA). 
110. Health Care, ATT’Y GEN. TEX., https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/cpd/health-care, 
[https://perma.cc/WF47-H3N6].  
111. AG Paxton Announces Lawsuit Against Major Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma for  
Violation of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, ATT’Y GEN. TEX. (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-announces-lawsuit-against-major-
opioid-manufacturer-purdue-pharma-violation-texas [https://perma.cc/FCX5-SP5V]; see State of 
Texas’s Original Petition ¶ 11.2, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. D–1–GN–18–002403 (345th Dist. 
Ct., Travis Cty., Tex. May 15, 2018), 2018 WL 2230020 (“Plaintiff alleges violations by Defendants of 
DTPA § 17.46(a) and DTPA § 17.46(b) from June 2007 to present.”). 
112. See Plaintiff’s Original Petition ¶ 2, State v. Purdue Pharma, Inc., No. 07.04195 (68th Dist. 
Ct., Dallas Cty., Tex. May 8, 2007) (detailing the authority under which Attorney General Greg Abbott 
brought an action against Purdue for its DTPA-violating business practices). 
113. See id. ¶ 8 (articulating why the state of Texas’s proceedings against Purdue were in the 
public interest). 
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State of Texas” by their deceptive marketing and misrepresentation 
practices.114 
To fulfill the second element of a DTPA claim, Texas can assert that 
opioid manufacturers breached DTPA section 17.46(b) when they 
propagated the deceptive message that opioids were a safe, effective, and 
compassionate form of long-term treatment for chronic pain by 
downplaying the addictive risk of consuming opioids and fabricating the 
appearance of credible scientific support for potential prescribers to rely 
on.115  As the foregoing analysis regarding a claim for misrepresentation 
elaborated, evidence of opioid manufacturers’ deceptive representations as 
to the addictive effects of opioids is rampant.116  A comparison of the 
allegations of DTPA breaches set forth in Texas’s 2007 lawsuit against 
Purdue and in the several recent lawsuits brought by individual cities, 
counties, and states against an array of opioid manufacturers indicates that 
opioid manufacturers have not been deterred from their deceptive 
marketing ways.117  
In Attorney General Abbott’s 2007 complaint, Purdue was accused of 
minimizing the risk of addiction inherent to using OxyContin as a pain 
management treatment.118  Purdue represented opioid addiction as 
“exceedingly rare[,]” repeatedly informing patients and prescribers through 
promotional materials that fewer than 1% of patients treated with opioids 
 
114. See State of Texas’s Original Petition, supra note 111, ¶ 4.2 (relying on DTPA 
section 17.47(a) to justify the proceedings against Purdue as advancing the public interest). 
115. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (declaring various acts and practices “false, 
misleading, or deceptive” and therefore violative of the DTPA). 
116. See, e.g., Van Zee, supra note 65, at 223 (discussing Purdue’s efforts to misrepresent the 
addictive nature of OxyContin by, for example, “train[ing] its sales representatives to carry the message 
that the risk of addiction was ‘less than one percent,’” despite ample studies “demonstrat[ing] that in 
the treatment of chronic non-cancer related pain with opioids, there is a high incidence of prescription 
drug abuse”).  
117. Compare Plaintiff’s Original Petition, supra note 112, ¶ 44 (“Although Purdue, in response 
to public scrutiny of widespread OxyContin abuse, has claimed to implement programs designed to 
guard against diversion and abuse, it has continued to try to convince doctors that their concerns of 
addiction, dependence, and abuse are misplaced.”), with Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 48, 
¶ 79 (“To convince doctors and patients that opioids are safe, Defendants deceptively trivialized and 
failed to disclose the risks of long-term opioid use, particularly the risk of addiction, through a series 
of misrepresentations that have been conclusively debunked by the FDA and CDC.”). 
118. See Plaintiff’s Original Petition, supra note 112, ¶ 39 (“From its product launch, Purdue 
knew that OxyContin was prone to abuse, dependence, addiction, and diversion.  But the linchpin of 
Purdue’s marketing strategy was to distinguish OxyContin from other opioids and their well known 
risk of abuse, and to avoid the stigma attached to these other opioids . . . .”). 
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became addicted.119  In the event that physicians expressed hesitation in 
prescribing OxyContin due to concerns of addiction, Purdue methodically 
trained its sales representatives to “avoid and minimize” their 
apprehensions.120  The complaint alleged four specific breaches by Purdue 
of the DTPA, including violations of: (1) section 17.46(b)(2)121 by 
“[c]ausing confusion or misunderstanding as to the safety of OxyContin” 
by evading or downplaying the known “risks of abuse, dependence, 
addiction and diversion”;122 (2) section 17.46(b)(5)123 by accrediting 
OxyContin as having benefits that are not attributable to the drug;124 
(3) section 17.46(b)(7)125 by misrepresenting “that OxyContin is of a 
particular standard, quality, or grade”;126 and (4) section 17.46(b)(24)127 by 
aggressively marketing OxyContin in a way “sometimes contrary to its label 
and indications,” while neglecting to disclose, warn of, and protect against 
 
119. See id. ¶ 42 (describing how Purdue disseminated deceptive marketing messages through 
promotional materials, such as relaying the message that less than 1% of opioid-consuming patients 
became addicted in a videotape for patient-viewing, entitled “From One Patient to Another,” and in 
promotional pamphlets); see, e.g., Our Amazing World, Purdue Pharma OxyContin Commercial, YOUTUBE 
(Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Er78Dj5hyeI [https://perma.cc/F7PT-
WPSD] (depicting a promotional video utilized by Purdue to market OxyContin in which a physician 
informs viewers—at about the 0:16 video position—that “the rate of addiction amongst pain patients 
who are treated by doctors is much less than 1%” and emphasizes—at roughly position 0:30—that 
opioids “are our best, strongest pain medications [and] should be used much more than they are for 
patients in pain”). 
120. See Plaintiff’s Original Petition, supra note 112, ¶¶ 43–44 (elucidating the inconsistency 
between Purdue’s purported implementation of programs meant to protect against diversion and abuse 
of OxyContin and the measures the opioid manufacturer took to “convince doctors that their concerns 
of addiction, dependence[,] and abuse [were] misplaced”). 
121. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(2) (declaring unlawful the act of “causing 
confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or 
services”). 
122. Plaintiff’s Original Petition, supra note 112, ¶ 53(A). 
123. BUS. & COM. § 17.46(b)(5) (proclaiming unlawful the act of “representing that goods or 
services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they 
do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which the 
person does not”). 
124. Plaintiff’s Original Petition, supra note 112, ¶ 53(B). 
125. BUS. & COM. § 17.46(b)(7) (holding unlawful the act of “representing that goods or 
services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, 
if they are of another”). 
126. Plaintiff’s Original Petition, supra note 112, ¶ 53(C). 
127. BUS. & COM. § 17.46(b)(24) (decreeing unlawful the act of “failing to disclose information 
concerning goods or services which was known at the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose 
such information was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer 
would not have entered had the information been disclosed”). 
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OxyContin’s health and safety risks, with the intention of inducing 
consumers into transactions that they would not have partaken in had they 
received adequate disclosure of such risks.128 
The 2007 lawsuit brought by Attorney General Greg Abbott ultimately 
culminated in a settlement agreement between Texas, twenty-five other 
states, and Purdue, which enabled Purdue to forego admitting to any DTPA 
violations while still proscribing the deceptive business practices that 
prompted the lawsuit in the first place.129  Despite the settlement agreement 
enjoining Purdue from making “any written or oral claim that is false, 
misleading[,] or deceptive” while promoting or marketing OxyContin, 
allegations made in recent lawsuits indicate that Purdue seemingly 
disregarded the injunction and prompted other opioid manufacturers to 
follow its deceptive marketing suit.130  For example, the arguments 
articulated in a recent federal lawsuit brought forth by McLennan County 
echoed the assertions made in the 2007 lawsuit, accusing several opioid 
manufacturers of unlawful business practices and condemning their leading 
role in the opioid epidemic.131  The complaint accused defendant-
manufacturers of spreading false and deceptive claims about the risks and 
 
128. Plaintiff’s Original Petition, supra note 112, ¶ 53(D).  
129. See Attorney General Abbott Halts Unlawful Marketing of Pain Killer, ATT’Y GEN. TEX. (May 10, 
2007), https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/oagnews/release.php?id=2003 [https://perma.cc/RMC3-
YKME] (providing an overview of the 2007 settlement agreement reached between Purdue, Texas, 
and twenty-five other states, in which Purdue was proscribed from using off-label marketing to 
promote OxyContin and from making false and embellished claims regarding OxyContin’s treatment 
qualities). 
130. E.g., Complaint ¶ 196, Rusk Cty. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2:17–cv–01534 (E.D. Wis. 
Nov. 11, 2017) (listing examples of opioid manufacturers misrepresenting the risk of opioid addiction, 
such as Purdue, in 2009, providing veterans with promotional materials that claimed the chance of 
becoming addicted to opioids for individuals who are not susceptible to addiction is “very unlikely[,]” 
suggesting that the risk is “immaterial”); see also Andrew Joseph, A Veteran New York  
Litigator Is Taking on Opioid Makers. They Have a History, STAT (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/10/opioid-lawsuits-paul-hanly/ [https://perma.cc/NQ8G-
KHFC] (expressing the surprise of an opioid litigation attorney—who helped pioneer the lawsuit 
against Purdue resulting in the 2007 settlement and who is representing cities and counties across five 
states in current opioid manufacturer lawsuits—that other opioid manufacturers “would be so foolish 
as to adopt essentially the same marketing tactics that Purdue had adopted”).  But see Addiction, Abuse, 
Misuse, and Diversion, OXYCONTIN, https://www.oxycontin.com/abuse-deterrence-studies/addiction-
abuse-misuse-diversion-rems.html [https://perma.cc/NZ3S-MHPB] (“Although the risk of addiction 
in any individual is unknown, it can occur in patients appropriately prescribed OxyContin.  Addiction 
can occur at recommended doses and if the drug is misused or abused[.]”). 
131. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint ¶¶ 16–18, Cty. of McLennan v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 
No. 6:17–cv–00298 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2017) (alleging acts and practices of multiple opioid 
manufacturer defendants aided the spread of the opioid epidemic in McLennan County).  
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benefits associated with long-term opioid use throughout McLennan 
County through direct marketing to doctors and patients and unbranded 
advertising by “so-called unbiased and independent third parties[.]”132  
These accusations were echoed in Texas’s lawsuit against Purdue, alleging 
that Purdue “disseminat[ed] the message that pain was undertreated; that 
opioids were non-addictive; that patients deserved to be pain free; and that 
its opioids were superior to non-opioids for pain relief.”133 
To directly market their branded opioids, manufacturers ran multi-
million-dollar advertising campaigns aimed at parading the claimed benefits 
of opioid use.134  Manufacturers collectively spent more than $14 million 
on medical journal advertisements in 2011 alone.135  The advertisements 
often depicted chronic pain-ridden patients, recommended the use of 
opioids for pain treatment, and implied that the drug would enable the 
patient to carry out a more fulfilling life liberated by pain-relief.136  A second 
means by which manufacturers directly marketed the use of their opioids 
for treatment of chronic pain was through the use of “detailers,” sales 
representatives trained by manufacturers to visit physicians and medical 
staff to promote direct sales with the potential prescribers.137  Opioid 
manufacturers expended an alarming $168 million on “detailing branded 
opioids to doctors” in 2014, doubling the amount spent in 2000.138  A 
 
132. See id. ¶¶ 41–42 (describing two methods employed by opioid manufacturers to 
disseminate deceptive information regarding opioid use in McLennan County: (1) direct marketing of 
branded opioids to doctors and patients and (2) unbranded advertising by purported independent third 
parties).  
133. State of Texas’s Original Petition, supra note 111, ¶ 10.5. 
134. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 131, ¶ 43 (identifying advertising campaigns 
“touting the purported benefits of their branded drugs” as manufacturers’ first technique of direct 
marketing). 
135. See id. ¶ 43 (“Defendants spent more than $14 million on medical journal advertising of 
opioids in 2011, nearly triple what they spent in 2001, including $8.3 million by Purdue, $4.9 million 
by Janssen, and $1.1 million by Endo.”).  
136. See id. ¶ 44 (recounting one advertisement from a series of so-called “Pain vignettes,” ran 
by Purdue in medical journals in 2012, in which Purdue implied that the use of OxyContin by a writer 
suffering from osteoarthritis of the hands would improve the writer’s ability to work more effectively); 
see also Complaint, supra note 130, ¶¶ 207–08 (detailing a patient education guide targeting pain 
management in older adults that Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sponsored, which asserts as a “fact” 
that “opioids are rarely addictive when used properly for the management of chronic pain” to combat 
the “myth” that “[o]pioid medications are always addictive”).  
137. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 62, ¶ 46 (explaining how manufacturers 
directly marketed their opioids for chronic pain relief through use of “detailers” who would make 
“direct sales contacts” with potential prescribers during in-office visits).   
138. See id. ¶ 46 (noting the massive financial resources opioid manufacturers allocated to 
marketing by detailers in 2014, with Purdue alone spending $108 million).  
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further deceptive method of opioid manufacturers’ direct marketing was the 
hosting of small-group speaker programs during which physician-speakers, 
compensated by the manufacturers, promoted the use of branded opioids 
to physician-attendees.139  Though the speakers appeared to be “providing 
unbiased and medically accurate presentations[,]” in actuality, they were 
reciting a script prepared by the sponsoring opioid manufacturer that 
disseminated deceptive information, omitted material data, and allowed 
prior misrepresentations regarding the risks and benefits of opioid use to 
remain uncorrected.140   
To circumvent federal regulation and to avoid penalties applicable to 
branded advertising after the 2007 settlement, opioid manufacturers 
invested in unbranded advertising, enabling them to “make the same false 
statements but evade punishment by making these statements about opioids 
as a whole, not about specific branded opioid drugs.”141  A common 
method of unbranded advertising was by disseminating messages through 
“key-opinion leaders” (KOLs)—medical professionals paid by opioid 
manufacturers to publicly endorse and aggressively promote the view that 
opioids were safe and effective for the long-term treatment of chronic 
pain.142  In their unbranded advertisements spread by KOLs, opioid 
manufacturers either failed to disclose the risks of addiction inherent to 
opioid use, or affirmatively denied or curtailed those risks.143  KOLs were 
sent to convince prescribers that opioids were not only harmless and 
effective for long-term use but “required in the compassionate treatment of 
chronic pain.”144  Knowing that prescribers often rely less critically on the 
 
139. See id. ¶ 47 (explaining how opioid manufacturers selected physicians to be compensated 
as speakers and promoters of branded opioids during small-group programs attended by other 
physicians).  
140. See id. ¶ 47 (discussing the deceptive nature of opioid manufacturers’ small-group programs 
and how such programs incentivized physicians to promote and prescribe branded opioids).  
141. See Complaint, supra note 130, ¶ 100 (differentiating between branded and unbranded 
advertising, the latter providing a platform for opioid manufacturers to make deceptive and 
unsubstantiated claims about the effectiveness and risks of opioids in general without violating the laws 
regulating branded advertisements).  
142. See id. ¶¶ 111–12 (recognizing key-opinion leaders as a crucial component of defendant 
opioid manufacturers’ deceptive marketing practices involving unbranded advertisements).  
143. See id. ¶ 110 (explaining how opioid manufacturers failed to disclose, affirmatively denied, 
or downplayed “the risks of addiction, abuse, misuse, and overdose” in their unbranded marketing 
schemes). 
144. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 48, ¶ 12 (focusing on the individual and 
concerted unbranded advertising efforts of opioid manufacturers to disseminate the message, through 
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professional guidance and opinions of their peers, opioid manufacturers 
exploited such reliance by cunningly masking their deceptive claims about 
the risks and benefits associated with long-term opioid use beneath the 
fabricated appearance of KOLs as a source of neutral and credible 
support.145  To further bolster the reliability of KOLs and the façade that 
opioid treatment for chronic pain presented a menial risk of addiction, 
opioid manufacturers paid KOLs to publish so-called “scientific” papers in 
support of the false and unsupported claims that opioids were a safe and 
effective means of treatment for chronic pain.146  They then allocated 
significant funding to the widespread distribution and marketing of KOLs’ 
“studies” and “articles,” touting them as “independent medical literature” 
to deceive prescribing physicians and drive them to treat patients with 
opioids.147 
Through direct marketing of branded opioids and unbranded marketing 
by KOLs, opioid manufacturers orchestrated a network of deception to 
spread their false and dangerous messages that long-term opioid treatment 
for chronic pain was safe and effective, to manipulate the sources of 
information that prescribers relied upon when assessing treatment options, 
and to catalyze the writing of opioid prescriptions.  As the foregoing 
allegations demonstrate, pharmaceutical opioid manufacturers have engaged 
in countless actions constituting per se deceptive trade practices under DTPA 
section 17.46(b).148 
In fabricating the reliability and neutrality of KOLs’ promotion of the 
false notion that opioids are a safe, effective, and necessary treatment option 
for long-term, chronic pain, opioid manufacturers violated DTPA 
section 17.46(b)(2) and (3)—causing confusion and misunderstanding as to 
the approval of opioids and who opioid manufacturers were affiliated 
with.149  By affirmatively denying or minimizing the risk of addiction that 
 
seemingly unbiased key-opinion leaders, that opioids were an effective and necessary component of 
compassionate pain management). 
145. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 62, ¶ 56 (distinguishing pro-opioid key-
opinion leaders as “one of the most important avenues that Defendants use to spread their false and 
deceptive statements[,]” given the “false appearance of unbiased and reliable support for chronic opioid 
therapy” that masks the misleading messages they promote). 
146. See Complaint, supra note 130, ¶ 118 (recognizing key-opinion leaders as a crucial 
component of defendant opioid manufacturers’ deceptive marketing practices involving unbranded 
advertisements).  
147. Id. 
148. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b). 
149. Id. §§ 17.46(b)(2)–(3). 
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long-term opioid use presents, in stark contrast to the CDC’s clear warning 
of such a risk, opioid manufacturers violated DTPA section 17.46(b)(5) and 
(7)—representing that opioids have certain characteristics or benefits, and 
are of a particular standard or quality, that they do not have.150  By failing 
to disclose the risk of addiction inherent to opioid use and failing to disclose 
that KOLs, disguised as unbiased physicians’ peers, were strategically 
selected, trained, and compensated to spread misinformation to potential 
prescribers, opioid manufacturers violated DTPA section 17.46(b)(24)—
failing to disclose information known at the time of the transaction with the 
intent to induce prescribers and patients into transactions into which they 
would not have entered had they been privy to the information.151  Finally, 
opioid manufacturers violated DTPA section 17.46(b)(31), which extends 
the scope of the DTPA to encompass manufacturers, sellers, distributers, 
and promoters of synthetic substances intended to produce an effect similar 
to that of a controlled substance,152 who “(A) mak[e] a deceptive 
 
150. Id. §§ 17.46(b)(5), (7). 
151. Id. § 17.46(b)(24). 
152. A “synthetic substance” is: 
an artificial substance that produces and is intended by the manufacturer to produce when 
consumed or ingested an effect similar to or in excess of the effect produced by the consumption 
or ingestion of a controlled substance or controlled substance analogue, as those terms are 
defined by [s]ection 481.002. 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.1191.  
The term “controlled substance” encompasses “a substance, including a drug, an adulterant, and 
a dilutant, listed in Schedules I through V or Penalty Group 1, 1-A, 2, 2-A, 3, or 4.”  Id. § 481.002(5).  
Because DTPA section 17.46(b)(31) is applicable to the manufacturing, selling, distributing, and 
promoting of synthetic substances, only manufacturers of synthetic opioids that produce and are 
intended to produce an effect similar to or greater than that of a controlled substance can be subjected 
to subsection (31).  See BUS. & COM. § 17.46(b)(31) (specifying the applicability of subsection (31) to 
synthetic substances); see also HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.102(2)–(3) (classifying opioid pain medications 
fentanyl, oxycodone, and hydrocodone as Penalty Group 1 substances—alongside heroin and 
cocaine—and thereby qualifying them as controlled substances under the DTPA).  
Synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, tramadol, and methadone, are chemically created in the 
laboratory setting and are commonly used for pain management and anesthesia.  Anaya Mandal, Opioid 
Types, NEWS MED., https://www.news-medical.net/health/Opioid-Types.aspx [https://perma.cc/B5 
HM-PMD9] (last updated Oct. 13, 2013).  Fentanyl, for example, is a synthetic opioid distributed by 
Janssen Pharmaceuticals under the brand-name “Duragesic,” which is used to “manage pain severe 
enough to require daily around-the-clock, long-term treatment with an opioid.”  Patient Information–
Medication Guide and Instructions, DURAGESIC, https://www.duragesic.com/patient-information.html 
[https://perma.cc/3HXE-KGNZ] (last updated Mar. 14, 2017).  Fentanyl delivers a potency fifty 
times greater than heroin and 100 times greater than morphine.  Synthetic Opioid Data, supra note 18.  Of 
the ten prescribers who made the most Medicare claims for fentanyl in 2016, three are Texas 
physicians—fourth was an interventional pain medicine specialist from Fort Worth who made 1,321 
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representation or designation about the synthetic substance; or (B) caus[e] 
confusion or misunderstanding as to the effects the synthetic substance 
causes when consumed or ingested[.]”153  By downplaying the addictive 
effect of consuming opioids for long-term pain treatment when marketing 
the drugs, synthetic opioid manufacturers breached subsection (31).154  
The final component of a viable DTPA claim is to establish injury 
resulting from the defendant’s DTPA breach.  In addition to the assertions 
of social and economic injury discussed in the previous claim for fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the following points are illustrative of the substantial 
injury Texas has suffered due to the opioid epidemic and the Big Pharma 
agents who fueled it.  In 2016 alone, accidental opioid poisoning claimed 
the lives of 1,107 Texans.155  The impact of opioid manufacturers’ 
deceptive marketing techniques and resulting economic and social injury  
has been largely localized to Bexar County—which comprises a mere 5%  
of Texas’s population, yet shoulders 66% of Texas’s opioid-related  
 
claims; eighth was a pain medicine specialist from Wichita Falls who made 1,213 claims, and  
tenth was a pain medicine specialist from Arlington who made 1,189 claims.  Fentanyl, PROPUBLICA, 
https://projects.propublica.org/checkup/drugs/4638 [https://perma.cc/W7K3-8GR9]. 
Closely related to synthetic opioids are semisynthetic opioids, such as hydrocodone and 
oxycodone, which are derived in part from natural opioids.  Mandal, supra.  Among overdose deaths 
attributable to prescription opioids, oxycodone—brand-named OxyContin by Purdue—and 
hydrocodone are two of the most commonly involved drugs.  When the Prescription Becomes the Problem, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/ 
prescribed.html [https://perma.cc/D42H-QZAY] (last updated Aug. 29, 2017).  In considering 
statutory governance over semi-synthetic opioids intended to produce an effect similar to or greater 
than the effect of certain controlled substances, a liberal construction of DTPA section 17.46(b)(31) 
could entail extending its governance to deceptive trade practices involving semi-synthetic opioids.  See 
BUS. & COM. § 17.44(a) (requiring a liberal construction and application of the DTPA to further its 
underlying purposes).   
OxyContin, for instance, operates as an extended-release opioid that presents “a greater risk for 
overdose and death due to the larger amount of oxycodone present.”  OxyContin Full Prescribing 
Information, supra note 89.  In addition to having a high oxycodone concentration, the conversion factors 
for switching pediatric patients above the age of eleven from some opioid analgesic controlled 
substances to OxyContin suggest OxyContin produces an effect greater than the controlled substances.  
When swapping hydrocodone or morphine for OxyContin, the conversion rates are 0.9 and 0.5 
respectively—establishing that a smaller dosage of OxyContin is expected to yield an effect similar or 
greater to the effect generated by each controlled substance.  Id.  Extending DTPA section 17.46(b)(31) 
to include both synthetic and semi-synthetic substances would permit Purdue to be held liable under 
subsection (31) for causing confusion as to the addictive effect of OxyContin.  BUS. & COM. 
§ 17.46(b)(31).  
153. BUS. & COM. § 17.46(b)(31). 
154. Id. 
155. Tex. Dep’t State Health Serv’s (@TexasDSHS), TWITTER (Oct. 27, 2017, 9:56 AM), 
https://twitter.com/texasdshs/status/923956634904420352 [https://perma.cc/3WTS-GNR4]. 
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issues.156  Among these issues is the fact that 25% of Texas newborns 
suffering from neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS), a condition caused by 
fetal exposure to addictive substances in the womb and resulting in 
withdrawals upon birth, are born in Bexar County—exemplifying the 
ruthless impact the opioid epidemic has both on lives ending and those just 
beginning.157  These social costs, and the extensive financial costs of 
extended care, hospitalization, treatment, and enforcement that accompany 
the opioid epidemic, are what prompted Bexar County to “sue all opioid 
drug manufacturers, promoters and distributors responsible for causing and 
contributing to an epidemic of opioid addiction” in the county.158  
Recognizing the injuries suffered in Bexar County as a microcosm of those 
experienced statewide, Texas can satisfy the injury component of a DTPA 
claim and successfully hold opioid manufacturers liable for the “false, 
misleading, [and] deceptive acts or practices” they have relied on.159 
V.    CONCLUSION  
Fraudulent misrepresentation and violation of the DTPA are only two of 
several theories of legal liability Texas can, and should, rely upon to hold 
opioid manufacturers liable for their contribution to the opioid epidemic 
and the widespread devastation they continue to cause in Texas 
communities.160  The juxtaposition emanating from the opioid epidemic 
 
156. Adrian Garcia, Bexar County Suing Opioid Industry to Combat Epidemic, KSAT (Oct. 3, 2017, 
5:52 PM) https://www.ksat.com/news/bexar-county-suing-opioid-industry-to-combat-epidemic 
[https://perma.cc/E3X7-NHE3]. 
157. Brittney Martin, Bexar County Highest in State for Babies Going Through Drug Withdrawal,  
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS (May 31, 2017, 11:05 PM), http://www.expressnews.com/news/ 
local/article/Bexar-County-highest-in-state-for-babies-going-11186935.php [https://perma.cc/P94G 
-D6JJ].  Given that Texas only collects data in cases of NAS occurring in Medicaid-funded deliveries, 
“NAS is likely underreported in Texas.”  See id. (“Despite hosting only 8.5[%] of the Medicaid-funded 
births in Texas in 2015, Bexar County had 25[%] of the state’s babies going through drug 
withdrawals.”). 
158. See Comm’rs Court, Item 54, BEXAR COUNTY (Oct. 3, 2017), http://bexarcountytx. 
swagit.com/play/10032017-618/#6 [https://perma.cc/7W3M-G5WG] (urging the Bexar County 
Commissioners Court to authorize action against opioid manufacturers, which would enable Bexar 
County to “lead the state of Texas in going forward against the drug companies who misled the public” 
(02:36) and to recuperate the devastating costs of the opioid epidemic); see also Homenko, supra note 44, 
at 283 (“In 2003, the annual direct cost of health care for an opioid abuser was on average $15,884, 
compared to $1,830 for a non-abuser.”). 
159.  BUS. & COM. § 17.46(b). 
160. See e.g., Complaint ¶ 6, City of Everett v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 17–2–00469 31 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2017) (attempting to hold Purdue liable for its intentional, reckless, and/or negligent 
failure to prevent the diversion of OxyContin into the black market). 
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between the big profits that Big Pharma has raked in and the death and 
financial ruin that communities have suffered cannot be overstated.161  
Opioid manufacturers continuously chose to value profits over the welfare 
of consumers, actively engaging in deceptive marketing schemes to push 
their pills at any cost.162  Bringing forth a parens patriae lawsuit on behalf of 
the State of Texas will hold opioid manufacturers liable for their leading role 
in the opioid epidemic and will enable Texas communities to recover the 
costs they have spent, and will continue to spend, battling the public health 
crisis that opioid manufacturers have profited from.163  While no dollar 
amount can be placed on the value of lives lost from opioid overdose,164 
financial accountability on the part of opioid manufacturers would be a step 
forward in overcoming the opioid epidemic.165  
  
 
161. See Ken Lammers, Jr., Rise of the Pills, 15 U.D.C. L. REV. 91, 100 (2011) (discussing the 
“moneyed American interests” driving the manufacturing, promotion, and prescribing of opioids—as 
exemplified by how the $600 million fine imposed on Purdue “in 2007 for purposefully and falsely 
marketing OxyContin as less addictive than it was” does not stop the drug company from aggressively 
marketing its product); Crime Stories with Nancy Grace, ‘My Child Died’: Opioid Plague Hits America, 
STITCHER (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/mrw-productions-llc/crime-stories-
with-nancy-grace/e/52382114 [https://perma.cc/9SUJ-FBBL] (“Altogether, the number of opioid 
overdose deaths in 2016 surpassed the number of deaths caused by the AIDS epidemic at its peak in 
1995.”).  
162. See Complaint, supra note 160, ¶ 11 (“In short, Purdue’s improper actions of placing profits 
over the welfare of the citizens of Everett have caused and will continue to cause substantial damages 
to Everett.”).  Purdue expressly agreed not to misrepresent OxyContin’s risk of abuse or addiction as 
part of its $19.5 million settlement with Texas and twenty-five other states in 2007.  See Final Judgment 
& Agreed Permanent Injunction ¶ 8, State v. Purdue Pharma, Inc., No. 07–04195 (68th Dist. Ct., 
Dallas Cty., Tex. May 8, 2007).  Yet in 2011, Purdue sponsored a CME program touting the theory of 
pseudoaddiction, advising attendees to not make the assumption that a patient is suffering from 
addiction “even if he persistently asks for a specific drug, seems desperate, hoards medicine, or 
‘overindulges in unapproved escalating doses[,]’” and implying that “prescribing a high-dose, long-
acting opioid” is the correct course of treatment for the patient’s pseudo addiction.  Fourth Amended 
Complaint, supra note 86, ¶ 54(e). 
163. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 62, ¶ 16 (regarding the large sums spent 
battling the opioid epidemic as a direct and foreseeable result of opioid manufacturers’ fraudulent 
marketing scheme).  
164. See The Opioid Epidemic in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.  SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/2017-opioids-infographic.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB3Z-
CQCG] (last updated May 2017) (reporting 15,281 deaths resulted from overdose of commonly 
prescribed opioids in 2015). 
165. See Ausness, supra note 50, at 1146 (recognizing parens patriae lawsuits as a successful means 
of protecting the wellbeing of citizens and a promising avenue for holding opioid manufacturers liable). 
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